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NOTE
Responding to Independent Juror Research in the
Internet Age: Positive Rules, Negative Rules, and
Outside Mechanisms
Robbie Manhas*
Independent juror research is an old problem for jury trials. It invites poten-
tially prejudicial, irrelevant, and inaccurate information to guide jury deci-
sionmaking. At the same time, independent juror research compromises our
adversarial system by preventing parties from responding to all the evidence
under consideration and obfuscating the record on which the jury’s decision is
made. These threats have only increased in the internet age, where inappro-
priate sources of information are ubiquitous and where improper access is
hard to detect. Nevertheless, courts and parties continue to engage in the same
inhibitory measures they have employed for decades. This Note argues for
change by providing a new conceptual framework for thinking about and cate-
gorizing responses to the problem: positive rules (court rules that channel in-
dependent juror research and the impulses that govern it into something
productive within our adversarial system), negative rules (court rules designed
to eliminate independent juror research and its effects by blocking and punish-
ing access to independent sources of information), and outside mechanisms
(the parties’ attempts to similarly stamp out this conduct and its effects). After
first analyzing the problem of juror research, this Note argues that the old-
fashioned system of negative rules and outside mechanisms is an inadequate
response to the growing problem. Although this Note offers insight about spe-
cific negative rules and outside mechanisms that may continue to be useful in
tackling the challenges of independent juror research—for example, by argu-
ing that trials should be prerecorded and videotaped—it ultimately contends
that the traditional framework must be supplemented by positive rules, which
will promote a more active jury. This Note concludes by endorsing two specific
positive rules: allowing the jury to ask questions (of the judge, witnesses, and
parties) and providing the jury with an electronic record.
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Introduction
Independent juror research has long been an issue in jury trials.1 Exam-
ples include jurors looking up legal terminology and principles,2 investigat-
ing details about the parties in their cases,3 and verifying expert testimony or
factual information presented at trial through their own inquiries.4 The
problem has taken new life, both in the academic literature5 and in the
1. See, e.g., Medler v. State ex rel. Dunn, 26 Ind. 171, 172 (1866) (considering a party’s
contention that juror misconduct arose because “one or two of the jury, without leave of the
court, read and commented upon a part of the charges of the court, and a part of the jury was
thus misled and deceived” and because “a part of the jury conversed with persons outside of
the court, during an adjournment, and while the case was pending” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Kanahele, 951 F. Supp. 928, 935 (D. Haw. 1996) (describing
how a juror “questioned [a] law librarian . . . about search and seizure law” and “subsequently
left the library with [a] treatise on the Constitution for a period of about twenty-five
minutes”).
3. See, e.g., John G. Browning, When All That Twitters Is Not Told: Dangers of the Online
Juror, 73 Tex. B.J. 216, 217–18 (2010) (describing cases hampered by juror internet miscon-
duct, including one case where “a juror admittedly sent Facebook ‘friend’ requests to two of
the plaintiffs, learned of their ‘party animal’ ways from their Facebook pages, and emailed
plaintiffs’ counsel that his client had ‘advocated the use of mushrooms and weed smoking, and
binge drinking all over the Internet’ ”).
4. See, e.g., Rocco v. Yates, No. CV 08-4604-GHK(JTL), 2009 WL 2095991, at *9 (C.D.
Cal. July 13, 2009) (explaining that a juror was not able to perform her duty in part because
she conducted computer research on the size of a .22, “the same caliber gun involved in the
charged crimes”).
5. See, e.g., Ralph Artigliere, Sequestration for the Twenty-First Century: Disconnecting
Jurors from the Internet During Trial, 59 Drake L. Rev. 621 (2011); Thaddeus Hoffmeister,
Google, Gadgets, and Guilt: Juror Misconduct in the Digital Age, 83 U. Colo. L. Rev. 409 (2012);
Caren Myers Morrison, Jury 2.0, 62 Hastings L.J. 1579 (2011).
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courts6 because the internet and portable electronic devices allow jurors to
easily and discreetly conduct such research.7 In light of the rising tide of
independent juror research facilitated by technology, courts need to consider
whether the current safeguards against such conduct adequately preserve the
integrity of the modern jury trial.
This Note argues that, to address the problem of independent juror re-
search in the internet age, courts should adopt liberalized procedural and
evidentiary rules that allow juries to take a more active role in judicial pro-
ceedings. Part I explains how, under the current regime, independent juror
research is antithetical, and consequently detrimental, to the integrity of tri-
als in our adversarial system. It argues that, given the internet’s ubiquity, the
problem of juror research has become more pressing than ever before, and it
highlights this development by reviewing a recent case and the general re-
sponse of courts. Part II evaluates these responses and classifies them as
“negative rules” (court rules designed to eliminate juror research by block-
ing access to outside sources or by disincentivizing access to such sources)
and “outside mechanisms” (parties’ attempts to do the same). It recom-
mends some reforms with regard to negative rules and outside mechanisms
(most notably by arguing for prerecorded videotaped trials) but ultimately
contends that while such rules and mechanisms are valuable, they are insuf-
ficient to adequately quell independent juror research; thus, “positive rules”
(court rules that transform the impulse underlying juror research from
something that undermines the system into something that undergirds it)
are a necessary supplement. Part III endorses a tripartite framework of posi-
tive rules, negative rules, and outside mechanisms. It advocates for the im-
plementation of two particular positive rules: allowing jurors to ask
6. See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 633–34 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 393 (2012) (holding that a juror’s misconduct in performing unauthorized research
into the definition of an element of a relevant offense on Wikipedia deprived the defendant of
his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial); Hill v. Gipson, No. 12-CV-00504-AWI-DLB(HC),
2012 WL 3645337, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2012) (reviewing a claim that “a juror did week-
end Internet research on the use of cellular telephone records, printed out an article, brought it
into the jury room, and discussed it with other jurors”).
7. Although this follows from common sense and practical experience, a dearth of ro-
bust empirical studies has left the precise scope of the problem unidentified. For one study in
the United States, see Hoffmeister, supra note 5, at 415 (“Approximately ten percent of the
respondents reported personal knowledge of a juror conducting Internet research. In light of
the difficulty of detecting this type of juror misconduct, this percentage probably under-
represents the actual number of jurors who use the Internet to research cases.” (footnote omit-
ted)). Further, a recent survey of jurors in England found that (1) 12% of jurors in high-
profile cases actively looked for information about their cases during trial (compared to 5% in
normal cases) and (2) 26% of jurors in high-profile cases saw media reports on the internet
during trial (compared to 13% in normal cases). Cheryl Thomas, Ministry of Justice, Are
Juries Fair? 43 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/re-
search-and-analysis/moj-research/are-juries-fair-research.pdf. These figures may be under-
stated because, although the jurors surveyed were “guaranteed anonymity . . . it should be
borne in mind that they were being asked to admit to doing something they may have
remembered being told not to do by the judge.” Id.
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questions of the judge and witnesses and providing jurors with an electronic
record.
I. The Problem of Independent Juror Research
Independent juror research is problematic under the current procedural
and evidentiary landscape because it undermines the adversarial system. In
the model adversarial world, each party advocates its position before an im-
partial judge or jury, who then renders judgment after weighing the infor-
mation presented.8 Independent juror research upsets this balance in a
number of ways, including by potentially exposing jurors to prejudicial, ir-
relevant, or inaccurate information, often without the knowledge of the
judge or the parties.9 As a result, some evidence is not subjected to adver-
sarial review, such as cross-examination or rebuttal. Insofar as an adversarial
process is essential to producing fair outcomes, perhaps the most important
detriment of independent juror research is that both sides lose the opportu-
nity to respond to all the information influencing the jury’s determina-
tion—which twists our adversarial system into something more akin to the
European inquisitorial system.10 Not only does this compromise the integrity
of the jury’s decision (because its foundations have not necessarily been sub-
jected to the truth-inducing rigors of the adversarial process),11 but it also
obfuscates the record on which the decision is made. In criminal trials in
particular, most of these worries are captured by the constitutional concern
that independent juror research “violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
rights to an impartial jury, to confront witnesses against him, and to be
present at all critical stages of his trial.”12
Whether through the internet or other means, independent juror re-
search has always presented these issues. Given that widespread access to the
internet now exists, however, the problem has become increasingly signifi-
cant for the modern jury trial.13 And although the way of obtaining infor-
mation and doing research has changed for jurors, judicial responses to the
8. Monroe H. Freedman, Our Constitutionalized Adversary System, 1 Chap. L. Rev. 57
(1998).
9. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
10. See Franklin Strier, Query, What Can the American Adversary System Learn from an
Inquisitorial System of Justice?, 76 Judicature 109, 109 (1992) (“Perhaps the most salient fea-
ture of inquisitorial trials is the court’s obligation to ascertain the truth of the contested matter
for itself.”).
11. See id. (“Characteristics of the adversary system include . . . a dialectical paradigm
for truth-seeking . . . .”).
12. United States v. Dyal, Cr. No. 3:09-1169-CMC, 2010 WL 2854292, at *12 (D.S.C.
July 19, 2010).
13. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also Daniel William Bell, Note, Juror
Misconduct and the Internet, 38 Am. J. Crim. L. 81, 83 (2010) (“The number of such incidents
[of independent juror research], however, seems to have dramatically increased since the ad-
vent of the Internet. While no substitute for empirical research, a cursory glance at Westlaw
search results is thought provoking. As of this writing, a search of all state and federal cases for
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phenomenon have remained relatively stagnant.14 Courts typically rely al-
most exclusively on traditional inhibitory rules, such as mistrials and seques-
tration, to prevent jurors from relying on information obtained outside of
court.15
Looking at a specific case helps to frame both the importance of the
problem the internet represents and the character of judicial responses. In
2012, the Fourth Circuit considered an instance of independent juror in-
ternet research in United States v. Lawson.16 There, a jury had convicted Law-
son and other defendants of violating the animal fighting prohibition of the
Animal Welfare Act for participating in “gamefowl derbies,” or “cockfight-
ing.”17 The statute in question prohibited, among other things, “spon-
sor[ing] or exhibit[ing] an animal in an animal fighting venture.”18 Six days
after the jury returned its verdict finding Lawson guilty on all charges, it
came to light that a juror had consulted some internet sources, including
Wikipedia’s definition of the term “sponsor,” the morning before the jury
reached its verdict.19 Further, the same juror brought a printout of the
Wikipedia entry to the jury room during deliberations.20 All of this conduct
occurred despite the explicit instructions of the district court, “which had
admonished the jurors not to conduct any outside research about the case,
including research on the internet.”21 Although the district court had denied
Lawson’s motion for a new trial, the Fourth Circuit found that the govern-
ment had failed “to rebut the presumption of prejudice” that arose from the
juror’s actions. It thus vacated the appellants’ convictions under the animal
fighting statute and awarded them a new trial.22
This is just one recent example of how independent juror internet re-
search has created lengthy, costly litigation, spanning both an appeal and a
remand.23 This case also highlights the rather limited nature of judicial
the term ‘juror misconduct’ yields 2701 results for the years 1980–1990, 3990 results for the
years 1990–2000, and 8755 results for the years 2000–2010.”).
14. Of the few innovations by courts, prohibiting electronic devices and improved jury
instructions are the most notable. See infra Sections II.A.1 and II.A.4, respectively.
15. See, e.g., Russo v. Takata Corp., 774 N.W.2d 441, 443–44 (S.D. 2009) (declaring a
mistrial because a juror conducted internet research).
16. 677 F.3d 629 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 393 (2012).
17. Lawson, 677 F.3d at 633 (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
19. Id. at 639.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 640.
22. Id. at 639, 651.
23. For other examples, see Brian Grow, As Jurors Go Online, U.S. Trials Go off Track,
Reuters (Dec. 8, 2010, 3:23 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/08/us-internet-ju-
rors-idUSTRE6B74Z820101208, and John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Google and Twitter, Mis-
trials Are Popping up, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/03/18/us/18juries.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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responses to the problem: one notable before-the-fact protection—jury in-
structions prohibiting outside research—and one after-the-fact protection—
declaring a mistrial and ordering a new trial. It is true that courts have been
known to adopt a few other before-the-fact safeguards, such as prohibiting
the use of electronic devices in the courthouse,24 sequestering the jury,25 and
fining jurors or holding them in contempt of court.26 Parties may also elimi-
nate jurors they suspect will conduct internet research through voir dire.27
But all these protections are predominately negative (in that they punish or
deprive jurors of access to sources of information) and seem to inhibit juror
activity and agency generally.28
Given the balance that must be achieved for a fair trial, these responses
are undoubtedly necessary in some measure. But imagine how much trouble
could have been avoided if, for example, Lawson had simply been allowed to
ask the parties or the court for clarification on the definition of “sponsor.”
As Professor Morrison has pointed out, some of the constraints on jurors
“reflect the modern conception of impartiality, which is frequently confused
with ignorance and passivity. . . . Internet access has given juries a means,
albeit an unauthorized one, of sending a signal that they are chafing under
the restrictions of their role.”29 The question that arises, then, is how to
alleviate this chafing without sacrificing the virtues of the adversarial system.
Part II articulates a formal framework of how courts and parties can do so
and suggests ways in which the court system could improve these measures
to better address the problems that independent juror internet research
raises.
II. A Framework That Both Curbs and Accommodates the
Research Impulse
Responses to the problem of juror internet research typically take two
forms: (1) “negative rules,” or court rules designed to eliminate juror re-
search and its effects by blocking access to outside sources or disincentiviz-
ing access to such sources, and (2) “outside mechanisms,” or actions taken
by the parties to remove or ameliorate the possibility of independent juror
24. See, e.g., Mich. Ct. R. 2.511(H)(2)(c), available at http://courts.mi.gov/Courts/
MichiganSupremeCourt/CurrentCourtRules/1Chapter2CivilProcedure.pdf (forbidding use
generally, but permitting use “during breaks or recesses but . . . not . . . to obtain or disclose
information”).
25. See infra Section II.A.2.
26. See infra Section II.A.5.
27. See infra Section II.B.1.
28. By this I mean that the measures stifle juror interest and investment in the trial. See
Morrison, supra note 5, at 1582 (“[T]he jury’s role has been reduced to that of an adding
machine, mechanically crunching the carefully screened evidence that is funneled into it, and
producing a verdict.”).
29. Id.
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research influencing the jury’s decision. An example of the former is forbid-
ding the use of electronic devices in the courthouse;30 an example of the
latter is removing likely offenders from the juror pool through voir dire.31 In
addition to negative rules and outside mechanisms, there is theoretically a
third response, one which has been unduly neglected: “positive rules,” or
court rules that channel jury activity, as well as the impulses that drive inde-
pendent juror research, into something productive in our adversarial system.
This Part contends that the court system must adopt a tripartite frame-
work of positive rules, negative rules, and outside mechanisms if it is to
satisfactorily address the problem of juror internet research. This Part first
assesses the merits of specific examples of both negative rules (Section II.A)
and outside mechanisms (Section II.B) and offers recommendations in these
areas, such as implementing more prerecorded videotaped trials. Section
II.C concludes that negative rules and outside mechanisms serve a valuable
purpose, but they cannot by themselves adequately solve the problem of
independent juror research. Thus, courts should also employ positive rules
as a supplement.
A. Negative Rules
Negative rules are court rules that attempt to eliminate juror research
from affecting juror decisionmaking, typically either by restricting access to
sources of independent research (e.g., the internet and electronic devices) or
by punishing or otherwise disincentivizing jurors who attempt to access
such sources. These rules are essential to ensuring a fair jury trial because
even if jurors should be allowed a more flexible, informed role, unfettered
access to information would invariably expose jurors to impermissibly prej-
udicial or otherwise inappropriate sources. Nevertheless, negative rules can-
not by themselves answer the problem of internet research: it is so easy to
access the internet and hard to monitor that access that nothing short of
intolerably onerous and expensive measures can completely stem the tide.
Furthermore, negative rules’ narrow focus on access ignores the intent and
purpose that cause jurors to go beyond the confines of court—elements that
are just as important as access in diagnosing and treating the problem. The
following examples illustrate both the virtues and vices of negative rules.
1. Forbidding Electronic Devices
To prevent jurors from conducting independent research and using so-
cial media during trial, courts are increasingly forbidding the use of elec-
tronic devices in the courthouse, at least during trial or deliberation.32 This
is a sensible rule; we do not, for example, want jurors looking up a defen-
dant’s criminal record while he is on the stand or tweeting their thoughts on
30. See infra Section II.A.1.
31. See infra Section II.B.1.
32. Bell, supra note 13, at 86–87.
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the deliberations. Even so, like most negative rules, forbidding the use of
electronic devices is an incomplete solution. Although such a rule may pre-
vent jurors from using electronic devices in the courthouse, in some juris-
dictions, jurors can use them during breaks.33 Moreover, jurors can always
use electronic devices before they arrive and can also use them after they
depart, which is problematic when trials last longer than a day.34
This problem could be avoided with shorter trials. One suggestion for
how to reasonably shorten trials is by conducting prerecorded videotaped
trials, discussed in Section II.A.3. Without shortening trials, however, for-
bidding electronic devices leaves jurors with many opportunities to do their
own research anyway. For this reason, forbidding electronic devices can be
seen as a less effective (and less burdensome) version of sequestration, dis-
cussed next.
2. Sequestration
Some courts also sequester jurors to prevent them from conducting in-
dependent research or otherwise being prejudiced. Sequestration is the ulti-
mate negative rule, in that exposure to outside information and use of
electronics tend to be so closely monitored and regulated that accessing the
internet for outside research is effectively blocked.35 Yet sequestration is
hardly a practical or desirable option in all but the most high-profile cases.
First, sequestration of a jury, like declaring a mistrial, is expensive.36 Further,
it places a large burden on jurors, as they are effectively under a form of
arrest for the duration of the trial.37 Most importantly, while sequestration is
33. See, e.g., Mich. Ct. R. 2.511(H)(2)(c), available at http://courts.mi.gov/Courts/
MichiganSupremeCourt/CurrentCourtRules/1Chapter2CivilProcedure.pdf.
34. See Bell, supra note 13, at 87 (“[E]ven if jurors were not allowed to use electronic
devices during breaks, at-home Internet use would remain unrestricted unless the jury were
sequestered.”). This is especially problematic given that most trials do last longer than a day.
See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, DuPage County Jury Commission, http://ejury.
dupageco.org/main.asp?id=faq (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) (explaining that in DuPage County,
Illinois, “[t]he average trial is 2 to 3 days”).
35. See, e.g., Kathy Matheson, For 12 Jurors Deliberating Jerry Sandusky Child Sex Abuse
Case, No TV, Twitter or Technology, Yahoo! News (June 22, 2012, 2:30 PM), http://news.
yahoo.com/12-jurors-deliberating-jerry-sandusky-child-sex-abuse-183033072.html (“[For the
jurors in the Jerry Sandusky case, t]here’s no Twitter, Facebook or radio. Smartphones, iPads
or laptops? No way. And the phones and televisions were removed from their hotel rooms.”);
Jeff Weiner, Casey Anthony Jurors: What Life Was Like for 17 Sequestered in Murder Trial, Or-
lando Sentinel, July 10, 2011, available at http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-07-09/
news/os-casey-anthony-jurors-lifestyle-20110709_1_casey-anthony-jurors-murder-trial-karen-
levey (“The jurors lived under the watchful eye of Orange County deputies, who monitored
them and transported them everywhere they went. They watched them as jurors made calls,
used the Web and met with family. . . . [T]he jurors were allowed to have cell phones, but they
were kept in the custody of deputies, who monitored phone calls as well as the limited internet
access jurors were allowed.”).
36. Marcy Strauss, Sequestration, 24 Am. J. Crim. L. 63, 105–06 (1996).
37. Id. at 106–09 (describing the psychological harms of sequestration, including a re-
counting of the experiences of one previously sequestered juror who had felt “like a prisoner”
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unquestionably effective, as discussed below, relying solely on this effective-
ness reveals the myopia of a system of negative rules bereft of complemen-
tary positive rules.
The fundamental problem, which lacks proper emphasis in the current
scholarship, is that negative rules like sequestration only address means of
accessing information, not the purposeful attitude of jurors that makes such
access so dangerous. Cell phones and computers are primarily worrisome
not because jurors might just happen to stumble upon prejudicial informa-
tion while browsing on them, but because jurors who intend to answer cer-
tain questions or do further research will purposefully use these devices to
accomplish those ends. Sequestration is unique among negative rules, in that
it theoretically overcomes this problem by blocking access so completely that
the intent of jurors is immaterial (they simply will not have the resources to
act on their intent). But the value of this effectiveness is undercut by the fact
that sequestration is harsh and expensive in most cases, making it unpopular
and infeasible except in cases that receive an inordinate amount of media
coverage.38 Aside from these rare cases, blocking access in the internet age is
not entirely possible and not quite enough: the purposeful attitude of jurors
is what ultimately needs to be addressed.
That said, given sequestration’s undeniable effectiveness, efforts should
be made to expand its reach, if the court system can effectuate such an ex-
pansion in a palatable manner. In particular, the signature defects of seques-
tration, namely the burdens it puts on jurors and the expense it imposes on
courts, can be remedied by shortening trials. One road toward shortening
trials is prerecorded videotaped trials, the subject of the next Section.
3. Prerecorded Videotaped Trials
Prerecorded videotaped trials (“PRVTTs”) are trials “in which all of the
testimony is prerecorded on videotape so that the judge can edit it before he
shows it to a jury.”39 One could classify PRVTTs as a negative rule if they
foreclose opportunities for jurors to conduct independent research. How-
ever, they have never been advocated as a negative rule per se; instead of
arguing for PRVTTs’ ability to eliminate juror research, advocates of the
method emphasize more generally that it economizes time (allowing a trial
to be conducted in one-half to one-third of its normal duration) and elimi-
nates the possibility of a mistrial (as the judge can edit out inadmissible
(quoting Mark Katches, Manson Jurors Know What Simpson Panel Is in for, L.A. Daily News,
Jan. 15, 1995, at N1) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
38. See Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal Trials in America, 1796–1996, 94
Mich. L. Rev. 2673, 2709 (1996) (noting that longer trials have made jury sequestration rarer
today, even while “[c]hanges in press coverage of criminal proceedings have . . . enlarged
opportunities for inappropriate behavior by jurors during trials”).
39. James L. McCrystal, Videotaped Trials: A Primer, 61 Judicature 250, 251 (1978).
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comments, questions, and answers).40 Nevertheless, considering how
PRVTTs multiply the benefits of other negative rules while concomitantly
reducing their burdens strengthens the argument for PRVTTs.
The reason for this is simple. Negative rules targeting independent juror
research endeavor to block access to the internet, but they tend to come in
two inadequate strains: (1) those that are arguably effective but exorbitant
(e.g., sequestration)41 and (2) those that are inexpensive but easily circum-
vented (e.g., forbidding electronic devices in the courthouse).42 Ultimately,
the length of unrecorded trials causes both forms of deficiency. Sequestra-
tion, for example, is burdensome because trials can take weeks or more,
forcing courts to upset the jurors’ normal lives for significant periods of
time.43 Likewise, forbidding electronic devices in a courthouse is ineffective
if trials take more than a day because then there are interstitial periods
where jurors go home and have access to electronic devices. But PRVTTs go
a long way toward curing the problem of time. And thus they have the po-
tential in many cases to make sequestering jurors more manageable and for-
bidding electronic devices more effective.44 If more trials last only one day,
forbidding electronic devices becomes a powerful tool in curbing the influ-
ence of internet research in our judicial system;45 if trials are shorter gener-
ally, sequestration becomes a feasible option in a broader range of cases.
People first suggested PRVTTs in the 1970s, and despite their clear bene-
fits and the encouraging reception by parties in cases in which they have
40. Id. at 253–54; see also Charles E. Stiver, Jr., Note, Video-Tape Trials: A Practical
Evaluation and a Legal Analysis, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 619, 621, 633–34 (1974) (noting that video-
tape “simplif[ies] retrial after mistrials” and that “out-of-court review of objections saves time
[during trials]”).
41. See supra Section II.A.2.
42. See supra Section II.A.1.
43. See, e.g., Jennifer Mascia, Can You Hear Justice Now?, Am. Prospect (July 8, 2011),
http://www.prospect.org/article/can-you-hear-justice-now (“The jurors and alternates in the
Anthony case were chosen in Clearwater, Florida, and shipped 100 miles east to Orlando,
where they lived in a hotel for 43 days . . . .”).
44. One commentator has already considered reducing the time jurors are sequestered
to make sequestration less burdensome. Strauss, supra note 36, at 118. However, Strauss dis-
misses this idea as unworkable because she only considers the imposition of time limits, which
would be arbitrary. Id. (“[H]ow is the time period [for sequestration] to be set and, perhaps
even more importantly, enforced? . . . . [H]ow do we even begin to pick an appropriate period?
And what happens if the trial goes longer than that time? Obviously, the judge cannot simply
end the trial at an arbitrary point and time predictions are notoriously inaccurate.”). As advo-
cated above, the light at the end of this tunnel of reasoning is to focus on time minimization
instead of time limitation. Rather than creating artificial limits on how much time juries can
be sequestered, courts can naturally minimize the time period of sequestration by reducing the
length of trials—and PRVTTs are a way of potentially doing so.
45. And there is some reason to believe that PRVTTs could render some trials day-long
affairs. See, e.g., Diane M. Hartmus, Videotrials, 23 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1996) (“The first
videotrial took place in 1971 . . . . The case . . . was a civil tort case . . . . A jury heard live
opening statements, viewed a two-and-one-half hour videotape of testimony, heard live clos-
ing statements and viewed prerecorded instructions from the judge in the course of a day. The
entire trial, including jury selection and deliberation, took only one day.” (footnote omitted)).
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been used, they have never quite taken root.46 Some objections to PRVTTs
are technical,47 but the main worry, at least ostensibly,48 is that “too much is
lost in translation from live to recorded testimony.”49 This concern, however,
becomes less compelling as technology becomes more sophisticated and we
as a culture become more accustomed to processing information via video-
tape.50 This is not to speculate as to where technology may take us but only
to point out that courtroom technology is already significantly better today
than it was in the 1970s and will likely continue to improve.51 Recorded
testimony has the potential to be more real and interactive than ever
before,52 and if courts are going to successfully tackle problems born in the
wake of modern technology, such as independent juror internet research,
they should adopt such technology for their own ends.
Further, even assuming that some gap would remain between live and
recorded testimony, it is, despite conventional wisdom and the declarations
of appellate courts, not clear that the opportunity to observe the demeanor
of testifying witnesses helps in evaluating their credibility. In fact, at least
some evidence indicates the opposite.53 Given the questionable value of di-
rect observation, the increasing quality of recording technology, and how
46. Richard O. Lempert et al., A Modern Approach to Evidence 1269 (4th ed.
2011).
47. Id. at 1269–70.
48. An unspoken, but more likely, explanation for the attitude against PRVTTs is that
attorneys are against change, especially when that change “limits the tactical moves that [they]
can make.” Id. at 1270. “Under this system, jurors do not hear—and therefore cannot be
influenced by—objections, excluded testimony, arguments on points of law, and the like.” Id.
49. Id.
50. See Hartmus, supra note 45, at 3 (“[In comparison to when PRVTTs were first
introduced,] video technology has improved significantly, and use is common. Most people
are very accustomed to viewing videotapes today, be it a rented movie or Uncle Fred’s tape of
the annual family reunion. Video has become an everyday part of our lives.”).
51. See, e.g., Patrick Michael, Technology in the Courtroom, L. Tech. Today (July 9,
2013), http://www.lawtechnologytoday.org/2013/07/technology-in-the-courtroom/ (describing
how Kentucky’s Jefferson County Circuit Court has installed a high-tech AV system); see also
Fredric I. Lederer, Technology Comes to the Courtroom, and . . ., 43 Emory L.J. 1095, 1099–100
(1994) (describing technological developments in courtrooms, including “[r]emote two-way
television arraignment and witness examination,” “[r]ecorded or real-time televised evidence
display,” “[b]uilt-in video deposition playback facilities,” “microchip-controlled, multi-cam-
era, multi-frame, video recording of proceedings . . . [with] optional synchronization to the
real-time transcript,” and more); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Video Depositions, Transcripts and Tri-
als, 43 Emory L.J. 1071, 1091 (1994) (“The technology exists to integrate video recordings
with desktop computer based script management. . . . [D]esktop computer multimedia tools
can obviate some of the problems associated with videotape.”).
52. See, e.g., Britney Fitzgerald, MIT’s New Video Technology Could Give You Superhu-
man Sight, Huffington Post (June 4, 2012, 6:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
06/04/eulerian-video-magnification-video-technology_n_1568956.html; Aaron Saenz, 3D Ho-
logram Prints Invade Military, Commercial Design, SingularityHUB (Dec. 16, 2010, 4:40
PM), http://singularityhub.com/2010/12/16/3d-hologram-prints-invade-military-commercial-
design-videos/.
53. Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1075, 1078–91 (1991). For
example, people probably overestimate the probative value of physical cues when someone else
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the widespread use of PRVTTs would improve negative rules like sequester-
ing jurors and forbidding electronic devices, courts should seriously con-
sider recording trials as a supplementary negative rule. But this rule is not a
cure-all; even if it is adopted in all cases, it cannot help block internet access
in trials that are so long that juror participation spans multiple days not-
withstanding that the proceedings are abbreviated by a well-edited
recording.
4. Jury Instructions
Other courts have responded to increasing internet usage by adopting
more detailed jury instructions, in the hopes that this will better alert jurors
to the dangers of improper internet activity.54 For example, in November
2010, Arizona’s Civil Jury Instructions Committee approved a revision of its
civil jury instructions, including significant discussion of internet issues in
its admonition against independent juror research.55
The relevant rule in Arizona’s preliminary criminal instructions, last
updated in 2013, features an elaborate discussion of juror internet use:
Each of you has gained knowledge and information from the experiences
you have had prior to this trial. Once this trial has begun you are to deter-
mine the facts of this case only from the evidence that is presented in this
courtroom. Arizona law prohibits a juror from receiving evidence not
properly admitted at trial. Therefore, do not do any research or make any
investigation about the case on your own. Do not view or visit the locations
where the events of the case took place. Do not consult any source such as a
newspaper, a dictionary, a reference manual, television, radio or the Internet
for information. If you have a question or need additional information,
submit your request in writing and I will discuss it with the attorneys.
Do not talk to anyone about the case, or about anyone who has anything to
do with it, and do not let anyone talk to you about those matters, until the
trial has ended, and you have been discharged as jurors. This prohibition
about not discussing the case includes using e-mail, Facebook, MySpace, Twit-
ter, instant messaging, Blackberry messaging, I-Phones, I-Touches, Google, Ya-
hoo, or any internet search engine, or any other form of electronic
communication for any purpose whatsoever, if it relates in any way to this
case. This includes, but is not limited to, blogging about the case or your
experience as a juror on this case, discussing the evidence, the lawyers, the
parties, the court, your deliberations, your reactions to testimony or exhib-
its or any aspect of the case or your courtroom experience with anyone
is speaking: practiced liars can fake the signals of truth-telling, but honest witnesses may be
nervous when questioned and thus may give signals that are read as indicative of dishonesty.
Removing these cues from the honesty analysis (for example, by reading a transcript) instead
focuses one on the content of what is being said, which is not as susceptible to such
misinterpretation.
54. Bell, supra note 13, at 89–91.
55. State Bar of Ariz., Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Civil) 11–12 (5th ed.
2013) (Preliminary Instruction 9). Unfortunately, this revision has not yet been submitted to
the Board of Governors for approval. Id. at 11.
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whatsoever, until the trial has ended, and you have been discharged as ju-
rors. Until then, you may tell people you are on a jury, and you may tell
them the estimated schedule for the trial, but do not tell them anything else
except to say that you cannot talk about the trial until it is over.
One reason for these prohibitions is because the trial process works by each
side knowing exactly what evidence is being considered by you and what law
you are applying to the facts you find. As I previously told you, the only
evidence you are to consider in this matter is that which is introduced in
the courtroom. The law that you are to apply is the law that I give you in
the final instructions. This prohibits you from consulting any outside
source.
If you have cell phones, laptops or other communication devices, please
turn them off and do not turn them on while in the courtroom. You may
use them only during breaks, so long as you do not use them to communi-
cate about any matter having to do with the case. You are not permitted to
take notes with laptops, Blackberries, tape recorders or any other electronic
device. You are only permitted to take notes on the notepad provided by
the court. Devices that can take pictures are prohibited and may not be
used for any purpose.56
Reformed jury instructions are a step in the right direction. This is true
even though some question the wisdom of alerting jurors to the many ave-
nues of research available to them.57 First, this worry may underestimate just
how pervasive internet usage is independent of any hints from the judiciary.
Second, and more important, specifying potential violations is probably
worthwhile because there is evidence that jurors would not realize that cer-
tain activities, such as Googling a term, constitute “research.”58 And third,
jurors need to understand why such conduct is prohibited. Pronouncements
from on high are not nearly as powerful as conscientious explanations that
56. State Bar of Ariz., Revised Arizona Jury Instructions – Criminal 6–7 (3d ed.
2013) (emphases added) (Preliminary Instruction 13).
57. The worry being that specifying all the various websites and electronic devices that
can be abused will only highlight their existence to jurors and thus encourage such abuse.
Daniel A. Ross, Juror Abuse of the Internet, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 8, 2009, at S4.
58. Dennis M. Sweeney, Address to the Litigation Section of the Maryland State Bar
Association: The Internet, Social Media and Jury Trials: Lessons Learned from the Dixon Trial
3 (Apr. 29, 2010) (transcript available at http://juries.typepad.com/files/judge-sweeney.doc)
(“Maryland’s Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, overturned a felony-murder
conviction because a deliberating juror conducted an on-line search for the terms ‘livor mor-
tis’ and ‘algor mortis’ on Wikipedia, printed out the pages, and brought them in to the jury
room. . . . When asked about it, the juror said, ‘To me that wasn’t research. It was a defini-
tion.’ ”). Note also the analogy to acts of prohibited juror communication, which juror expert
Paula Hannaford-Agor explains are often mistakes: “For some, tweeting and blogging are sim-
ply an extension of thinking, rather than a form of written communication.” Paula Hanna-
ford-Agor, Google Mistrials, Twittering Jurors, Juror Blogs, and Other Technological Hazards, Ct.
Manager, Summer 2009, at 42, 43.
822 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 112:809
treat jurors with respect as intelligent individuals.59 Since no number of ad-
monishments can prevent jurors from using the internet if they really want
to, courts are better off appealing to their reason. Arizona’s criminal jury
instructions only briefly touch on such an explanation, but this should be
the core of any such instruction.
5. Reporting Offending Behavior
Some jury instructions encourage jurors to report any instances of inde-
pendent research that come to their attention, as courts cannot prevent what
they do not perceive. This is a negative rule that, like declaring a mistrial, is
remedial, not preemptive. It complements explaining to jurors why indepen-
dent research can be so detrimental to the process: if we can convince at
least some jurors of the harm independent research causes, they will be
more likely to inform the judge if a breakdown occurs.60 Furthermore, en-
couraging such reports may deter those who would otherwise research, or at
least deter them from revealing the results of their research to other jurors
(and thus prevent total contamination of the jury). The Judicial Conference
Committee on Court Administration and Case Management has adopted
this rule in its new model jury instructions.61
The question that arises, of course, is what to do once a juror reports a
violation. One option is to admonish, but not actually discipline, violators
in the hopes of securing their cooperation;62 another is to exclude violators
59. See Ellen Brickman et al., How Juror Internet Use Has Changed the American Jury
Trial, 1 J. Ct. Innovation 287, 297 (2008) (“Judges can acknowledge the temptations of In-
ternet research, but then can explain to jurors why their cooperation in refraining from extrin-
sic research is so vitally important to the fairness of the judicial system. . . . An understanding
of why this rule is not arbitrary should enhance jurors’ commitment to adhering to it.”);
Elizabeth F. Loftus & Douglas Leber, Do Jurors Talk?, Trial, Jan. 1986, at 59, 60 (suggesting, in
the context of prohibitions on juror discussions, that judges should explain the reasoning
behind orders to increase juror adherence).
60. According to at least one study, asking jurors to report misbehavior is perhaps the
single most effective means of detection. See Meghan Dunn, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Jurors’
Use of Social Media During Trials and Deliberations 4 (2011), available at http://www.
fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dunnjuror.pdf/$file/dunnjuror.pdf (“Judges acknowledge that it
is difficult to detect jurors’ inappropriate use of social media. Of the 28 judges who indicated
how they learned of the incident, most said another juror had reported it (13 judges).”).
61. Judicial Conference Comm. on Court Admin. & Case Mgmt., Proposed
Model Jury Instructions: The Use of Electronic Technology to Conduct Research
on or Communicate About a Case 1 (2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
News/2012/jury-instructions.pdf (“I expect you will inform me as soon as you become aware
of another juror’s violation of these instructions.”).
62. Although, while courts have acted leniently in some instances of juror internet us-
age, when it comes to independent juror research on the internet, court reactions tend to be
more severe. See generally Michael K. Kiernan & Samuel E. Cooley, Juror Misconduct in the Age
of Social Networking, 62 FDCC Q. 179, 184–89 (2012) (describing court reactions in various
instances of juror internet usage).
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from participating in deliberations.63 A third option is to punish them if
they violate the prohibition on independent jury research.64
This third option might be seen as controversial: Does the benefit such a
rule confers outweigh the risk of deterring people from serving on juries?65
It does not seem unreasonable to hold jurors accountable for violations of
rules on internet research. This is true as long as two conditions are met: (1)
courts implement positive rules that allow jurors to exercise their curiosity
in ways that work productively within the system and (2) the judicial re-
sponse is tailored to the violation (i.e., a judge has the sound discretion
whether to admonish, remove, or punish). Insofar as courts disincentivize
internet research as much as possible through positive rules, and judges give
jury instructions in sufficient detail so that jurors understand that a ban on
research is far from arbitrary, a contempt rule of this sort would be an even-
handed disincentive to doing internet research.
6. Mistrial
Declaring a mistrial is more than a remedy for a violation of the prohi-
bition on independent juror research; it is also a negative rule, in that it
disincentivizes outside research by eliminating the possibility that such re-
search will affect the ultimate disposition of a case. In keeping with mistrial’s
dual nature as a remedy, however, it is a negative rule of last resort. At least
two good reasons support its classification as a nuclear option. First, holding
a new trial is expensive (with regard to both time and money).66 Second, and
perhaps more important, the move is remedial, as opposed to prevent-
ative—nothing in declaring a mistrial ensures that a new trial will not be
63. E.g., Moore v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 781, 787 (8th Cir. 2009) (“After
the case was submitted to the jury, one of the jurors did some research on the internet and
determined what American Family’s profits had been in the past year. The district judge then
excused the juror from further participation . . . .”); United States v. Bristol-Mártir, 570 F.3d
29, 37–38 (1st Cir. 2009) (describing how a juror who did internet research was replaced with
an alternate).
64. E.g., Annmarie Timmins, Juror Behind Mistrial Pleads, Pays $1,200, Concord Mon-
itor (Oct. 10, 2009), http://www.concordmonitor.com/article/juror-behind-mistrial-pleads-
pays-1200 (describing a case where the offending juror had to pay a $1,200 fine for causing a
mistrial by revealing that the defendant was a convicted child molester); Ed White, Juror Had-
ley Jons Punished for Posting Verdict on Facebook, Huffington Post (Sept. 2, 2010, 9:44 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/02/hadley-jons-juror-punishe_n_703877.html
(describing a Michigan case where the offending juror had to write a five-page essay about the
constitutional right to a fair trial and pay a $250 fine after posting the verdict on Facebook).
65. Bell, supra note 13, at 94 (“[I]t is generally inadvisable to punish jurors who con-
duct outside research. . . . [T]he prospect of punishment is likely to discourage people from
jury service altogether.”).
66. Amanda McGee, Comment, Juror Misconduct in the Twenty-First Century: The Prev-
alence of the Internet and Its Effect on American Courtrooms, 30 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 301, 302
(2010).
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contaminated by similar misconduct.67 Although declaring a mistrial is nec-
essary when other negative rules have failed, our system should ideally be
able to depend on other rules eliminating and channeling juror action so
that mistrials are kept to a minimum. This notion reinforces the need for
positive rules: all the examples of mistrials mentioned in this Note resulted
from a breakdown of negative rules and outside mechanisms (e.g., offending
jurors were not eliminated during voir dire and subsequently ignored jury
instructions prohibiting them from internet research).68
B. Outside Mechanisms
Courts should not and do not bear the burden of dealing with the prob-
lem of independent juror research by themselves. Outside mechanisms, like
negative rules, are actions meant to eliminate such research and its effects.
Unlike negative rules, however, outside mechanisms are a product of parties,
not courts. Extensive discussion of these mechanisms is unnecessary, as re-
viewing a couple of examples will demonstrate that they are limited in the
same way as negative rules or any other inhibitory measures: they are pre-
ventative but ultimately unable either to completely block access to research
or to inhibit the inclination to research in the first place.
1. Eliminating Likely Offenders Through Voir Dire
The most obvious way that parties step in is by eliminating likely of-
fenders through voir dire. For example, one might hypothesize that there are
telltale signs, such as a strong social media presence and a high rate of in-
ternet and electronics use, that a particular person would use the internet
for improper ends. In fact, many attorneys already look into jurors’ digital
or internet “footprints”—by, for example, running Google searches of their
own and looking at social networking sites and databases—and “courts and
state bar associations have both approved and encouraged the practice.”69
This theoretically allows parties to preempt instances of juror misconduct by
eliminating veniremembers, and it also highlights to judges and litigants
how much they have to stress the importance of not violating the prohibi-
tion against independent juror research to those who are eventually chosen.
On the other hand, there may be concerns about juror privacy, and even the
67. Bell, supra note 13, at 86. One might counter that while there is no guarantee (or
even extra protection afforded) against contamination in the new trial, it is unlikely to be
repeated simply on the (im)probability of the same event occurring twice. The strength of this
point depends on how common juror research is in the first place—although mistrials (and
detecting juror research) may be rare events, this does not mean that juror research itself is
rare, and thus an additional trial may not be enough to guard against its occurrence.
68. E.g., Russo v. Takata Corp., 774 N.W.2d 441, 444 (S.D. 2009) (declaring a mistrial
because a juror conducted internet research upon receiving his summons, either ignoring or
misunderstanding the instructions therein prohibiting outside research, and this fact did not
come to light until after the verdict was rendered because attorneys handling the case did not
directly raise the topic during voir dire).
69. Hoffmeister, supra note 5, at 442–43 (footnote omitted).
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best vetting process will miss some future offenders (especially since attor-
neys may choose not to eliminate a juror whose internet usage may be an
advantage).70 One could also question whether “internet presence” really
tracks a propensity to break rules; just because one is more familiar with the
internet does not mean that one is more likely to abuse it. More important,
like most negative rules (and unlike positive rules), elimination through voir
dire does not address why some people break the rules.71
2. Dealing with the Immediate Universe of Internet Information
Practitioners might also (and presumably do) confront the fact that,
unless sequestration occurs, jurors always have the potential to conduct
some amount of internet research. If so, they need to be aware of the uni-
verse of information that is available on the internet and consider whether it
is possible to tailor their arguments, questioning of witnesses, and interac-
tions with the jury in a way that assuages jurors prejudiced by information
on the web. Of course, this ultimately comes down to the context of the
specific case at hand, and in many instances, it may be impossible to ade-
quately immunize a trial and its outcome from damaging information avail-
able on the internet (such as if the client has an extensive criminal record).
Thus, although being responsive to information on the internet is an outside
mechanism built into any competent lawyering, it cannot sufficiently re-
spond to the problem of independent juror research.
C. The Need for Positive Rules: Negative Rules and Outside Mechanisms
Are Insufficient
The corrupting dynamic between juror research and the adversarial sys-
tem described in Part I is not inherent. Rather, it is a function of the partic-
ular procedural and evidentiary rules that our system does and does not
adopt. Because courts are loath to implement reforms that would allow the
jury to become more active,72 jury research and all that comes with it (that
is, juror independence) have been seen as anathema, and all rules spawned
to deal with the problem have focused on eliminating the conduct. From
this reactionary instinct, courts and parties have developed negative rules
and outside mechanisms of the sort analyzed in this Part.
Although this may have been a viable response in a different era, its
focus is clearly misguided in the internet age. This is because blocking access
targets only a necessary condition (the availability of means) rather than the
root cause (the intent to carry out) of independent juror internet research.
Unfortunately, the necessary condition of access is increasingly easy to sat-
isfy, despite courts’ efforts to block access with negative rules—such that
70. Id. at 444.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., id. at 415 (“[T]he topic of allowing jurors to ask questions of witnesses . . .
was met with disapproval by most Jury Survey respondents.”).
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even if courts were willing to engage in an ever-escalating war against tech-
nological advancement, they would be fighting a losing battle. As explained
above, although inhibitory steps are necessary, they are ultimately insuffi-
cient: the internet’s ease-of-access to information and the jury’s ease-of-ac-
cess to the internet cannot be overcome by anything short of prohibitively
expensive and draconian measures, such as sequestration of the jury, which
are (rightly) implemented infrequently.73 Thus, a large amount of juror re-
search invariably goes unprevented and undetected.74
It is true that developing more effective negative rules and outside
mechanisms can help alleviate this problem; this Part, for example, has spe-
cifically recommended utilizing PRVTTs and instituting other reforms that
reduce the length of trials as a way of multiplying the effectiveness of nega-
tive rules such as sequestering the jury and forbidding electronic devices.75
But if the pervasive presence of undetected juror research is deemed to seri-
ously undermine the integrity of jury trials, the clear upshot of the impossi-
bility of fully blocking access is that the impulse motivating jurors to
conduct research must be accommodated. Theoretically, we could integrate
jury research, or at least some of its main drivers, into our legal system
without stripping the system of its adversarial character. Juror research
would no longer undercut the adversarial system but would undergird it—
and would in fact illuminate the jury’s decisionmaking process.
Specifically, the problem presented by juror research can be solved by a
framework consisting of positive rules, negative rules, and outside mecha-
nisms. Positive rules are court rules that harness the intent that jurors act on
when engaging in independent research by slotting those jurors into our
adversarial system in a systematic fashion. A relatively uncontroversial exam-
ple would be to allow jurors to ask questions during trial (although this
Note makes the more radical suggestion of allowing jurors to pose questions
to the parties themselves, instead of just to witnesses76). A less explored, and
presumably more contentious, positive rule would be to allow jurors access
to an online record. Both examples channel juror activity in a way that
quells the desire to go outside the system to get information. In doing so,
positive rules avoid juror prejudice and other detriments of independent
research writ large.
Ultimately, this means that we must allow juries to become more active.
This is not to say that negative rules and outside mechanisms are per se
flawed. In general, negative rules and outside mechanisms serve an integral
function in this proposed framework: they act as lassos that corral juror
conduct, blocking prejudicial and otherwise undesirable juror behavior
while allowing positive rules to step in and channel what is left into a useful,
truth-promoting activity. Negative rules and outside mechanisms, at their
73. Strauss, supra note 36, at 68.
74. See Bell, supra note 13, at 86 n.38.
75. Supra Section II.A.1 (electronic devices), II.A.2 (sequestration).
76. Infra Section III.A.
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best, are not blunt instruments designed to stamp out any and all indepen-
dent juror action. Rather, they are carefully tailored devices that shepherd
independent juror conduct either into or out of the courtroom, depending
on its appropriateness. But unhelpful juror activity cannot be stymied com-
pletely, and we must allow positive rules to pick up the slack. Part III argues
in favor of two specific positive rules and against one to demonstrate in
concrete terms how the court system might accomplish this.
III. Evaluating the Merits of Specific Positive Rules
There are a number of plausible impulses driving any given juror to
conduct independent research, including a desire to be actively involved,77 a
desire to remedy confusion about a legal term or piece of evidence,78 and a
desire to learn or promote the truth.79 It is the job of negative rules and
outside mechanisms to limit these impulses, or at least the behavior they
motivate, when they are likely to lead to impermissible results, such as preju-
dicing the jury. As elaborated in Part II, however, some slippage is unavoida-
ble. Further, these impulses can in fact be beneficial in our adversarial
system if courts use proper positive rules to harness them in a way that is
legally productive. Part III suggests that courts adopt at least two specific
positive rules: (1) allowing jurors to ask questions of the witnesses and par-
ties at trial (Section III.A) and (2) allowing jurors independent access to an
electronic record of trial transcripts and other evidence (Section III.B).
A. Allowing Jurors to Ask Questions
Although it has received only cursory mention in the literature as a way
to combat independent juror research,80 one reform that some courts are
nonetheless beginning to implement is allowing jurors to ask questions.81
Academics and judges alike have mostly clamored for this change on
grounds other than preventing juror research: questions ensure that jurors
are active, engaged decisionmakers,82 provide insight into the jury’s
77. See Caren Myers Morrison, Can the Jury Trial Survive Google?, Crim. Just., Winter
2011, at 4, 14.
78. See Tapanes v. State, 43 So. 3d 159, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (describing how a
juror looked up the definition of the word “prudent” on his smartphone and shared this
information with other jurors).
79. See Timmins, supra note 64 (“Paul Christiansen of Danbury revealed Timothy
Townsend’s prior conviction during the second day of deliberations on new child sexual as-
sault charges, according to court records. He said afterward that he had no regrets because he
believed jurors need to know about Townsend’s past.”).
80. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 5, at 1625–26.
81. For example, judges must permit juror questions of witnesses in civil cases in Flor-
ida. Fla. Stat. § 40.50(3) (2013); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.452. In general, however, “letting jurors ask
questions in criminal trials is still the exception.” Morrison, supra note 77, at 13.
82. Mark A. Frankel, A Trial Judge’s Perspective on Providing Tools for Rational Jury
Decisionmaking, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 221, 224 (1990) (“Enhancement of juror satisfaction is an
important component in encouraging and rewarding citizen participation in the democratic
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deliberations and reasoning,83 make jurors more informed decision-
makers,84 and provide other assorted benefits.85 However, allowing jurors to
ask questions deserves more in-depth analysis and advocacy in the context of
responding to independent juror research, as it would counter one factor
that presumably leads jurors to turn to the internet in the first place—the
existence of burning questions that jurors are unable to answer through al-
lowed channels.86
Indeed, it is eminently reasonable to allow jurors to ask questions dur-
ing the course of trial. Because both sides would hear and be able to respond
to questions, what was previously an activity that would have thwarted the
adversarial process (inquiry behind the closed doors of the internet) would
be transformed into an activity that strengthens it (by adding to the com-
pleteness of the record on which the jury makes its decision). Although the
literature arguing for allowing juror questions limits itself to endorsing juror
questions of witnesses or the judge,87 it is hard to see why jurors should not
be allowed to ask questions of the parties as well.88 Courts should expand the
range of questions as much as is appropriate to maximally preempt indepen-
dent juror research. Further, allowing a wider range of questions augments
the protective net of negative rules and outside mechanisms: if jurors ask
improper questions or questions that indicate that they have been doing
outside research, courts and parties can take note, investigate, and respond
accordingly.
One might wonder whether allowing jurors to ask questions is a worka-
ble response to the problem of internet research. Particular concerns arise
process. Jurors are more attentive when given the opportunity to ask questions, even if they
choose not to exercise it.”).
83. B. Michael Dann, “Learning Lessons” and “Speaking Rights”: Creating Educated and
Democratic Juries, 68 Ind. L.J. 1229, 1261 (1993) (“Jurors’ questions, looked on by many law-
yers and judges as an inconvenience or worse, should be viewed as welcomed opportunities to
learn about jurors’ thinking and to determine whether additional or corrective action is neces-
sary to ensure juror comprehension.” (footnote omitted)).
84. Peter B. Krupp, When Jurors Speak: A Practical Guide to Jurors Questioning Witnesses
in Massachusetts, Bos. B.J., Sept.–Oct. 2001, at 12, 12 (“There can be little dispute that a juror,
who does not understand certain terms used in a line of questions or who cannot picture the
scene, will not follow or recall the line of questioning as well as a juror who does. Thus,
advocates of juror questions have pointed to the salutary benefits of jurors being able to seek
clarification by questioning . . . .”).
85. See generally Kirsten DeBarba, Note, Maintaining the Adversarial System: The Prac-
tice of Allowing Jurors to Question Witnesses During Trial, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1521, 1532 (2002).
86. See brad, Comment to As Jurors Turn to Web, Mistrials Are Popping up, N.Y. Times
(Mar. 17, 2009, 2:46 PM), http://community.nytimes.com/comments/www.nytimes.com/2009/
03/18/us/18juries.html?sort=newest&offset=9 (“As someone who has sat on several juries, in
each case myself and the other jurors felt frustrated by the lack of key information that would
help us feel comfortable that we made the right decision. We also felt deeply frustrated at our
inability to fill those gaps in our knowledge.”).
87. See, e.g., Dann, supra note 83.
88. “Parties” here refers to the actual parties, if they testified earlier, or, at the very least,
the counsel representing the parties, where there might be constitutional concerns (such as a
defendant’s right not to testify).
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from a choice that courts would have to make in implementing the rule:
Would jurors submit questions to the judge, who could sort and frame them
as suitable questions,89 or would jurors submit their questions directly to
witnesses and parties with no oversight? Requiring jurors to submit ques-
tions to the judge raises worries about efficacy. If jurors turn to the internet
because the legally proper methods of learning about a case are not forth-
coming, limiting questions might push jurors back into the realm of inde-
pendent research. On the other hand, the alternative approach—having
jurors submit questions directly with no oversight—may lack propriety be-
cause jurors could ask prejudicial and otherwise inappropriate questions
that witnesses and parties might answer. There is also the fear of juror ani-
mosity should a party object.
This threat of impropriety and prejudice should guide courts as they
liberalize their rules concerning jury questions. In accordance with the prac-
tice of courts that have allowed for jury questions, the judge (and maybe the
parties) should vet the questions to make sure that jurors ask only appropri-
ate questions. To decide otherwise would undermine the foundational prem-
ises of evidence in our judicial system.90 In response to efficacy concerns,
courts need a complementary system that employs both positive and nega-
tive rules. For example, a negative rule, like detailed jury instructions that
explain why some questions are inappropriate and would compromise a fair
trial, will curb jurors’ tendency to perform independent research if answers
to questions at trial are not forthcoming.
Finally, from a broader perspective, observers must recognize that no
single rule is going to be a panacea. The goal is to create a more robust
system that better addresses the consequences of pervasive internet use. Al-
lowing jurors to ask questions imposes minimal burdens,91 and one of its
many benefits is that some jurors will have their questions answered, elimi-
nating one impetus for independent research.
B. Allowing Jurors Access to an Electronic Record
One positive rule that would go a long way toward preventing indepen-
dent juror research would be allowing jurors access to a centralized, court-
maintained electronic record. Surprisingly, this has not been implemented
89. Alternatively, as is the case in Florida, the vetting process could be as follows: “Out
of the presence of the jury, the judge will read the question to all counsel, allow counsel to see
the written question, and give counsel an opportunity to object to the question.” Fla. R. Civ.
P. 1.452(c).
90. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.” (emphasis added)).
91. See Frankel, supra note 82, at 225 (“The only potential drawbacks [of allowing ju-
rors to ask questions] are some added delay (approximately three minutes per question), and
the possibility that jurors will engage in speculation if a question is not permitted. This latter
concern may also be viewed as a positive, in that an otherwise inappropriate area of juror
focus can be identified and the juror instructed that it is not a proper basis for inquiry.”).
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by any court or suggested in the literature. Providing access to an electronic
record, like instituting PRVTTs, would be a way of using technology to com-
bat the problems that technology itself has imposed on courts.
What exactly this record would contain or should look like is open for
debate. One idea would be to have a PACER-like record available to jurors in
a case,92 which would include the documents and motions filed, the exhibits
presented, and so on.93 No matter what type of electronic record courts pro-
vide, however, having information such as the testimony the jurors heard
would presumably be helpful in the decisionmaking process, especially if the
trial has been long and complicated. More important, and more relevant to
the problem of independent juror research, this record might prevent jurors
from reaching out to other sources for the information the record contains.
If a juror, after a long trial, is hazy on a definition or a piece of evidence, he
may go to unauthorized internet sources to get resolution, but if he had
access to a record that contained the information presented at trial, his need
might already be addressed.
Consequently, in determining what to include in the record, courts
should consider the information that jurors are most likely to seek out. Of
course, just because jurors are likely to seek out a certain sort of information
does not mean that it would necessarily be a wise addition to an online
record—courts should still bear in mind potential prejudice and other nega-
tive effects. On the other hand, courts should be cognizant of the threat of
arbitrariness; if some juries are aware of information because some jurors
independently look it up, and other juries are not because they follow the
rules, the arbitrary result is reason to start providing the information on an
electronic record available to all.
Even if all the information that a juror might wish to look up is not
available on the record (for reasons of prejudice, for example), providing a
record is nonetheless a sound idea. An electronic record would provide at
least some information that a juror might otherwise look up, and thus at
least incrementally reduce the need for outside research. It would also sat-
isfy, to some degree, the impulses that drive jurors to research, such as the
desire to be actively involved, to do a good job, and to be well informed.94
One potential counterargument against providing an electronic record
is that it would simply remind the juror of the information available on the
internet—getting clarity on certain things presented at trial would merely
give a juror more fodder to compare against unauthorized online sources. It
is hard to see, however, how this would create more independent juror re-
search, and it is easy to see how it would create less. Presumably, someone
who would not do independent juror research before having access to an
92. “PACER” is an acronym for Public Access to Court Electronic Records, an elec-
tronic public database service that provides access to U.S. federal court documents.
93. We might even make available transcripts of the testimony of witnesses in the case.
Not only would this help the jury be more informed but it may also help calibrate determina-
tions of demeanor that the jurors made when hearing the witnesses testify. See supra note 53.
94. See supra Part III.
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electronic record would not do so out of respect for the rules (or fear of the
consequences), and these incentives would not change if an electronic record
were available. Meanwhile, a person who would do independent juror re-
search before having access to an electronic record might respect the rules
(or fear the consequences) enough that he would heed them if they could
resolve certain gaps in knowledge that an electronic record might provide.
A bigger concern may be administrative cost and technical know-how
on the part of the courts, but once a system has been built, it should be easy
and cost-effective to replicate. As a potential extension or adaptation of al-
ready-popular “E-filing” systems,95 it is hard to see how making an elec-
tronic record available to the jury would be too costly or difficult for courts
to realize. Such a system could be integrated alongside a general prohibition
on using electronic devices in the courthouse. For example, a court could
allow jurors access only to certain court computers and could even make the
record available only on an intranet. Providing an electronic record thus
affords a simple example of how courts could implement positive and nega-
tive rules together to facilitate a coherent and effective approach to address-
ing the problem of independent juror research.
Conclusion
Although the problem of juror research is an intractable one, a tripartite
system of positive rules, negative rules, and outside mechanisms is more
robust than the one that courts currently employ. This system is also more
likely to mitigate the harmful influence of juror research on jury decisions.
As such, it will be increasingly necessary to effectuate judicious coordination
of these three elements as internet access and juror research become more
common. With regard to specific negative rules, courts should institute
PRVTTs to increase the effectiveness of sequestering jurors and forbidding
electronic devices. As for positive rules, courts should allow jurors to ask
questions of the witnesses, parties, and judge, and courts should also pro-
vide jurors with an electronic record. In combination with negative rules
and outside mechanisms, such positive rules would serve to accommodate
the impulses underlying juror research while containing the resultant activ-
ity in a court-controlled, adversarial environment.
95. W. Kelly Stewart & Jeffrey L. Mills, E-Filing or E-Failure: New Risks Every Litigator
Should Know, For the Defense, June 2011, at 28, 28 (“[There has been] increasing use of
electronic filing—indeed, sometimes mandatory use—in virtually all federal district and
bankruptcy courts, many federal appellate courts, state courts and administrative agencies
. . . .”). See generally Alan Carlson & Tobias Hartmann, The Cost of Not E-Filing, 88 Judica-
ture 7, 7 (2004) (“E-filing is the process through which law firms file documents electroni-
cally with the court and serve them on participating attorneys via a secure, Internet-based
system. . . . E-filing also enables parties, their attorneys, and judges to immediately access their
case files via the Internet, eliminating the time-consuming process of obtaining files from the
law office file system or requesting files from the court clerk.”).
